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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No.  09-1079
                              
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AHMED JOAQUIN, a/k/a/ Ahmeed Joaquin
AHMED JOAQUIN,
Appellant
                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-08-cr-00031-001)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 11, 2010
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : January 25, 2010)
                              
OPINION
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Ahmed Joaquin pled guilty in the District of New Jersey to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon and was sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively
      The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction1
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  “The abuse-of-discretion standard
applies to both our procedural and substantive reasonableness inquiries.”  United States v.
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  We also review the District Court’s
decision to impose a consecutive sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Swan,
275 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2002).   
      According to the Presentence Investigation Report, the state charges were dismissed.2
2
to an undischarged sentence on drug charges in state court.  He now appeals that sentence
as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  We disagree, and thus affirm. 1
I.
In July 2007, two Newark police officers in plainclothes observed Joaquin running
from a group of uniformed police officers who had responded to a report of a stolen
vehicle near a public housing complex.  The officers stopped and frisked Joaquin and
discovered a loaded .32 caliber pistol in his pocket.  The officers arrested Joaquin and
during a search of his person discovered two “decks” of heroin and a vial of cocaine.  
Joaquin was initially charged with drug and firearm offenses in New Jersey state
court.  The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey then adopted
the case for federal prosecution.   In January 2008, a federal grand jury returned an2
indictment charging Joaquin with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He pled guilty to this offense in June 2008. 
Joaquin was sentenced in December 2008.  The United States Probation Office
determined that his total offense level was 25, which included a four-level upward
adjustment because Joaquin possessed a firearm in connection with a drug-trafficking
      Joaquin does not challenge on appeal the District Court’s denial of a downward3
departure under § 4A1.3.
      According to the Presentence Investigation Report, these charges arose from4
Joaquin’s May 2006 arrest for selling heroin and crack cocaine in Newark. 
3
offense.  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6).  His criminal history category was VI, with a resulting
Guideline range of 110 to 120 months’ imprisonment.  At sentencing, Joaquin argued,
among other things, that (1) the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement was improper because he had
not been engaged in a drug transaction when he was stopped by police; and (2) his
criminal history category of VI overstated the seriousness of his criminal record,
warranting a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.  The District Court agreed
with Joaquin’s first argument and declined to apply the four-level enhancement.  The
Court rejected his second argument, finding that, “if anything, the criminal history
category . . . understate[d] Mr. Joaquin’s [criminal] record.”  3
Joaquin’s adjusted offense level was 21, with a resulting Guideline range of 77 to
96 months’ imprisonment.  At sentencing, he requested that the District Court sentence
him at the bottom of the Guideline range.  Joaquin also requested that his sentence run
concurrently to a six-year sentence he was serving on drug-trafficking offenses brought in
state court, which was imposed in December 2007 (shortly before he was indicted
federally in January 2008).   The District Court rejected Joaquin’s requests and sentenced4
him to 96 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to his undischarged state court
sentence.  Joaquin timely appealed.    
4II.
“Our responsibility on appellate review of a criminal sentence is limited yet
important: we are to ensure that a substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in
a procedurally fair way.”  United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Our review proceeds in two stages.  First, we “ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  Second, we consider
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentence is substantively
reasonable.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.  “[I]f the district court’s sentence is procedurally
sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the
same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Id.
at 568.    
Where “a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject
to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or
consecutively.”  18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).  The district court must consider the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors when deciding whether to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence. 
Id. § 3584(b).  The policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) provides that a sentence may
5be imposed consecutively to an undischarged sentence “to achieve a reasonable
punishment for the instant offense.”
III.
Joaquin contends that the District Court’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable
because the Court was “so overly preoccupied with the punitive aspects of sentencing”
that it failed to consider mitigating factors demonstrating that a consecutive sentence was
“greater than necessary” to achieve the sentencing objectives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
The record reveals otherwise.  The District Court stated that it had “listened very
carefully” to Joaquin’s arguments that a concurrent sentence was warranted in light of his
underprivileged background, his brief employment after he was released from prison in
2004, and the fact that he had recently learned to read and write.  The Court, however,
was not persuaded that these factors outweighed the need for a consecutive sentence.  See
United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007) (a district court’s “failure to
give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they deserve” does not render the
sentence unreasonable).  
The Court explained that Joaquin’s significant criminal record “indicate[d] that
[he] indeed need[ed] to be deterred,” and that a lengthy sentence was required “to
demonstrate to [him] that [his] . . . felony weapons convictions, plus all of [his] prior drug
convictions[,] are extraordinarily serious in our current environment.”  See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (B).  The Court noted that Joaquin had received “relatively lenient
      Joaquin has not identified the basis for his belief that he would not be charged5
federally.  
      Even without those additional criminal history points, Joaquin’s criminal history6
category would have remained VI.  
6
sentences” for his past crimes, which included (1) five convictions for drug offenses for
which Joaquin received terms of imprisonment with periods of parole ineligibility of one,
two, or three years; (2) an arrest for assaulting the woman he was dating, for which he
was permitted to plead guilty to a lesser offense and was fined $150; and (3) another
arrest for assaulting the same person in violation of a restraining order, for which he was
permitted to plead guilty to contempt of court and served 28 days in prison.  Finally, the
Court emphasized the need to deter others from engaging in similar conduct, and to
protect the public from further crimes Joaquin might commit.  See id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B),
(C).     
Joaquin nonetheless complains that when he was sentenced on state drug charges
in December 2007, he believed “there would be no federal charges” arising out of his July
2007 arrest.    Joaquin represents that, had he known he would face such a federal charge,5
he would have attempted to delay his sentencing in state court until after his sentencing in
federal court, thus avoiding the imposition of a consecutive federal sentence, as well as
the three additional criminal history points that resulted from his state court conviction.  6
He contends that the District Court committed procedural error by failing to consider the
possibility that a consecutive sentence would create a “disparate sentencing situation
7between [] Joaquin and a similarly situated defendant,” as Joaquin now faces “a much
longer sentence than someone who was able to resolve [both] offenses in a single
jurisdiction, or someone who had been sentenced first at the federal level and thereafter
received a concurrent sentence in state court.”     
We disagree.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) directs district courts to consider “the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct.”  See also U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 cmt. n. 3(A) (district
courts should consider whether a consecutive or concurrent sentence will “achieve a
reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense and avoid unwarranted
disparity”).  It is apparent that the District Court determined that any “disparity” resulting
from the sequence of Joaquin’s state and federal court sentencings was not unwarranted
in light of Joaquin’s criminal record.  The Court noted that Joaquin had been jointly
sentenced for four prior offenses and, as a result, had received a “package deal” that
likely reduced his aggregate sentence for those offenses.  The Court explained that a
consecutive sentence was necessary in this case to impress upon Joaquin that there is “a
point where courts will not give [him] package deals for all of [his] offenses simply as a
matter of expediency.”  In this context, we discern no procedural error in the Court’s
decision to impose a consecutive sentence.
In sum, our review of the record confirms that the District Court gave “rational and
meaningful” consideration to the relevant § 3553(a) factors in imposing its sentence. 
8United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  We therefore
conclude that the Court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.
IV.
Joaquin finally argues that the District Court’s imposition of a term of 96 months’
imprisonment—to run consecutively to his state court sentence of six years (with a parole
ineligibility of three years)—resulted in an “overly punitive” and substantively
unreasonable sentence.  We conclude, however, that his sentence “falls within the broad
range of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in light of the § 3553(a)
factors.”  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Tomko, 562
F.3d at 568.  Accordingly, we affirm his sentence.
